(1) Exercising the concept of the "impossible trilemma" to understand why Russell's government found itself in this crisis position, and to outline some of the classic policy responses. Evidence suggests that the crisis was characterized by "commercial distress and financial panic, the extremity of which was remarkable" in the words of Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel. (2) Identifying central bank "sterilization" of cross-border capital flows. (3) Reviewing the pivotal nature of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the ways in which this law created unintended consequences, namely promoting credit expansion to create stock market speculation, and limiting the flexibility of the Bank of England. (4) Considering the pros and cons of flexible monetary policy and the role of lender of last resort. The suspension of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 is an important point in the history of central banking, as it represents one of the earliest (perhaps the first) official government action as a lender of last resort. (5) Surveying the history of the financial crisis of 1847, which proved highly influential in shaping public-sector responses to subsequent financial crises in Britain and the United States.